

Towards a Social Cohesion Barometer for South Africa

Research Paper

SOCIAL
COHESION

BAROMETER

S.A.

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This paper aims to inform policy-makers, researchers and development practitioners in South Africa in building the evidence-base and its use in policy-making to address poverty and inequality. It is supported by the Programme to Support Pro-Poor Policy Development (PSPPD), a partnership between the Presidency, The republic of South Africa and the European Union. For more information about the PSPPD go to www.pspdp.org.za



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List of Acronyms

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

The promotion of unity and social cohesion continues to be a key goal of the ANC and its government – African National Congress (2011: 14)

Since 1994 we have sought to create a united cohesive society out of our fragmented past. We are called upon to continue this mission of promoting unity in diversity and to develop a shared value system, based on the spirit of community solidarity and a caring society. Our shared value system should encourage us to become active citizens in the renewal of our country. – President Jacob Zuma, State of the Nation Address, June 2009

The term 'social cohesion' has become common in South African development debates, featured in government planning documents, academic panels, media debates and Parliamentary hearings. Its meaning and importance in these settings are intuitively clear, connoting 'solidarity' and a safer, 'caring', more equal and harmonious national society. South Africans are generally worried that the country's legacy of racial division remains unresolved and that class divisions, along with unresolved regional, ethnic and cultural divides and prejudices, brood beneath the national surface and may re-erupt if the country's economic, political or demographic stresses worsen. The term 'social cohesion' seems to group all these pressing issues into one over-arching question: how South African citizens can be brought to think and act in solidarity, in the interests of everyone, and the nation as a whole.

People seeking to translate 'social cohesion' into empirical research or real-world policy have however been hindered by uncertainty about exactly what the term means. The term 'social cohesion' seems to disaggregate into factors such as health care, education and jobs, which have robust track records in both research and public policy. But confronting such factors, researchers remain uncertain. If 'social cohesion' can be reduced to a cluster of social conditions, can it truly be assessed simply by considering the sum of relevant indicators, such as jobs, education and hiring patterns? 'Social cohesion' suggests that some larger, overarching quality or condition in society either drives

these indicators or emerges from their combination. So if social cohesion is a distinct quality or condition of society, how is that quality identified and measured? And precisely how will South African public policy benefit from doing so?

The overall objective of this research paper is to present a measurement framework that will enable researchers to measure social cohesion in South Africa. The researchers were challenged to operationalise the concept, and had to rely on literature and expert opinions to construct a conceptual framework, which attempted to incorporate the complexities associated with the concept, while simultaneously providing a platform that could be used as a measurement framework.

This research paper builds upon a broader project (The South African Social Cohesion Barometer project) (Struwig, et. al., 2011) conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), and is structured in the following manner:

- A short review of social cohesion efforts that have been undertaken by the post-apartheid state in South Africa.
- A definition of social cohesion that underpinned the conceptual framework for this project.
- An outline of the conceptual approach and model on which our proposed multidimensional barometer of social cohesion are premised.
- A discussion of the methodology, data used and statistical techniques employed to construct the barometer.
- Individual discussions about the economic, socio-cultural and civic cohesion domains.
- The construction of a social cohesion barometer and the presentation of results from the various domains in a single diagram.
- Conclusion and next steps.

SOCIAL COHESION WITHIN THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT

In common with decision-makers in other parts of the world, over the course of the last decade there has been increasing reference to a number of perceived threats that collectively erode social cohesion in South African society, especially since the mid-2000s. The Presidency's Fifteen Year Review raises concerns about persisting income inequality, criminal victimisation, declining public confidence in political institutions and state performance, low levels of interpersonal trust, racism, xenophobia and the straining of traditional family and community safety nets (The Presidency, 2008b). More recently, the National Planning Commission's diagnostic document on nation-building (NPC, 2011) refers to a series of fault lines that serve as an impediment to social cohesion and that need to be addressed urgently. These are: the divisive effects of institutionalised racism; class divisions; social fragmentation; language; spatial exclusion; sexism; unemployment; crime, corruption, unequal experiences of the law; and moral decline.

It is evident from government documents, announcements, speeches and deliberative actions that a robust political will exists to ensure social cohesion in South Africa, both in terms of the legitimacy of the state and in promoting active citizenship in the country. Some examples of government initiatives around social cohesion are discussed below.

- The Presidency's Fifteen Year Review (FYR) listed 'building social cohesion and state legitimacy' as a key element of the government's development strategy. The document also identified development indicators clustered around ten themes that required regular monitoring, including social cohesion and good governance. Accordingly, the Presidency's Development Indicators 2008, 2009 and 2010 documents list, among the 80 measures, a set of nine items about social cohesion and a further seven items about good governance (see Appendix Table 1).
- The National Planning Commission is currently working on the preparation of Vision 2025 – a national long-term perspective for the country that has been conceived as a shared agenda for South Africa's growth and development - and a national

strategic plan outlining the range of policies and interventions aimed at progressively realising the vision. Thematic areas that have been identified for this visioning exercise include the legitimacy, effectiveness and efficiency of governance, and the extent of social cohesion.

- The National Planning Commission released a diagnostic overview report together with a set of five diagnostic documents in June 2011, two of which pertain to the themes of nation building, institutions and governance.
- The government's Programme of Action for the Social Cluster in recent years has firmly included the promotion of social cohesion as one of its core priority actions. During the Cabinet lekgotla in mid-2010, a new Programme of Action with the focus on an outcomes-based approach centred on 12 priorities was adopted.
- A concept paper on social cohesion and integrated development planning was developed by the Department of Social Development, and was being incorporated into the Department of Art and Culture's National Strategy and Action Plan on social cohesion as of mid-2011.

These are examples of some of the more recent initiatives undertaken by government to encourage social cohesion in South Africa. For a more comprehensive discussion on these initiatives please refer to the main report (Struwig, et.al., 2011).

DEFINING SOCIAL COHESION

3 DEFINING SOCIAL COHESION

To undertake this project, an operational definition for social cohesion had to be sought. After careful scrutiny of literature and much debate, the definition of Green, Janmaat and Han (2009) was accepted as the definition underpinning our conceptual framework. The definition reads:

“Social cohesion refers to the property by which whole societies, and the individuals within them, are bound together through the action of specific attitudes, behaviours, rules and institutions which rely on consensus rather than pure coercion”.

This definition captures the essence of the phenomenon while at the same time being broad enough to allow analysis of a complex and wide range of real-life situations. It does not include potential causes or effects of the phenomenon, but allows for the inclusion of both subjective (opinions, attitudinal and values) and objective (behavioural) indicators.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK SOCIAL COHESION

4

CONSTRUCTING A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL COHESION

Both the literature review and opinions from the experts demonstrated that there is very little agreement about social cohesion. According to Kearns and Forrest (2000) the definition and measurement of social cohesion differs among disciplines and research topics and is often considered to be vague and abstract.


Jensen (1998) was the first to elaborate on five dimension measuring social cohesion namely: (1) affiliation/isolation (the sharing of common values, feelings of belonging); (2) insertion/exclusion (opportunities to share in the labour market); (3) participation/passivity (involvement and participation in public affairs); (4) acceptance/rejection (tolerance regarding differences); (5) legitimacy/illegitimacy (how adequately the various institutions represent the people and their interests).

Bernard (1999) build on Jensen's work and constructed a framework based on the domains of activity (economic, political and socio-cultural) and on the formal/attitudinal or substantial/behaviour characteristic of the dimensions. The framework constructed in this paper follows Bernard's conceptualisation. It similarly identifies three domains to be considered when researching or analysing social cohesion (Figure 1). The first domain discusses issues of economic development and fosters strategies to reduce wealth disparities. The second domain, the political or civic domain, discusses issues relating to common values and a lively civic culture. It also refers to a society in which social disorder is absent and social control mechanisms are established. The third domain discusses the socio-cultural domain and incorporates issues of social capital, trust, tolerance and shared identities. The conceptual framework also distinguishes between passive relationships (attitudinal) and active relationships (behavioural), which evolve to social integration (or inclusion).

A number of key principals underpin the conceptual and operational approach of the framework:

- The measurement framework has to be multidimensional, considering three domains, namely the economic, socio-cultural and the civic.
- The framework should include subjective (attitudinal) and objective (behavioural) measures.
- Some degree of overlap among the indicators within each domain and across domains is envisaged.
- Some indicators will be more stable than others. For instance, assessments of political indicators may be more fluid, while responses to family values indicators may remain more constant over time.
- Social cohesion is an attribute of a group or society not individuals. Although data is collected at the individual or micro level, the aim is to aggregate individual information to describe social cohesion at a group level.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework for social cohesion



METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENT APPROACH

5.1 Data utilised

For the purposes of this research paper, the 2009 and 2010 South African Social Attitude Survey (SASAS) data were analysed. The survey is conducted annually and covers a wide range of topics, such as attitudes about democracy and governance, service delivery, race relations, crime, moral issues, and poverty. The survey is designed to yield a representative sample of adults of 16 years of age and older, regardless of their nationality or citizenship. The HSRC's Master Sample was developed using the Census 2001 and the Enumerator Area (EA) as the primary sampling unit (Pillay, Roberts & Rule, 2006). Explicit and implicit stratification is applied to ensure that the geographic profiles of the targeted population such as province, geographic location, age category, gender, race, education level, living standard measurement (LSM) and current employment status are represented in the sample. Respondents are randomly selected at the various households.

Since researchers had to rely on secondary data, they implicitly had to rely on the questions that were fielded in the SASAS 2009/2010 questionnaires. Questions that had a potential bearing on social cohesion were selected and analysed for the purpose of this paper. This was restrictive to the researchers since they did not have the opportunity to design questions that would fit the social cohesion framework.

5.2 Operationalisation of the measurement approach

To operationalise the project for measurement, certain key assumptions were made. Firstly, assumptions were made regarding “bonding” versus “bridging” cohesion. The distinction between bridging and bonding cohesion is clarified by Putnam (2000). Bridging cohesion or connectedness is formed across diverse social groups, is horizontal in nature, and is based on common interests that transcend heterogeneous differences of ethnicity, religion and socio-economic status. In contrast, bonding cohesion refers to exclusive social ties that people build around homogeneity. Bonding capital may lead to certain communities bonding within communities, at the expense of integration into a wider society usually benefiting only members belonging to this closed social group or network. This project aimed at measuring bridging cohesion and sought indicators that encouraged attitudes and behaviour in the economic, civic and socio-cultural domains that reflect elements of bridging cohesion. Assumptions in the economic domain therefore inter alia assumed opportunities to share in the labour market and redress the socio-cultural domain assumed acceptance of the other and tolerance and the civic domain assumed participation and legitimacy of representative institutions as signs of social cohesion. Other assumptions were:

- In constructing this model, researchers had to be parsimonious in their selection of indicators and had to choose a discreet set of variables to measure each indicator.
- Indicators had to be the best possible direct measures of that domain of social cohesion.
- Indicators had to measure major features of that domain of cohesion, not conditions experienced by small numbers of people or areas.
- Measures that capture almost no-one or almost everyone would not be used.
- Individuals could score relatively high in one domain but poorly in another; the assumption being that social cohesion is cumulative (or additive) rather than cancelling.

These assumptions were informed by the criteria used to select indicators for the domains in the Provincial Indices of Multiple Deprivation (PIMD) project (Noble, et. al. 2009).

5.3 Statistical method used

In undertaking this study, a number of steps were undertaken to develop the indicators.

Theoretical framework: A theoretical conceptual framework was developed that provided the basis for the categorisation, selection and combination of single indicators (questions fielded in the survey) into meaningful composite indicators.

Data selection: The project relied on secondary data collected by the SASAS survey. The SASAS questions were scrutinised and selected if they were deemed appropriate indicators for any of the three domains. Selected questions were tested for analytical soundness, measurability and relevance to the phenomenon being measured and their relationship to each other.

Multivariate analysis: Exploratory analysis (in the form of factor analysis using Principal Components Analysis) was undertaken to determine which questions could form indicators in the domains.

Normalisation. Indicators were transformed to render them comparable. The final set of domain scores were converted to a 0–100 scale to enable the researchers to compare and plot findings of the various domains on a single platform. The higher the score on the 0–100 scale, the higher the score on social cohesion.

Weighting and aggregation. Each indicator or variable, regardless of the domain, was given an equal weight. Although this can be construed as simplistic, the rationale was that the researchers did not have enough evidence to underpin decisions that did not assume an equal weighting approach. Aggregation was also done by just adding the variables together.

In a last analytical step, regression analysis was performed to examine the relationship between basic demographic and the respective domain variables. The economic, socio-cultural and civic domain scores were compared to form the basis of the multidimensional social cohesion barometer¹.

¹ In the comprehensive report (Struwig et.al. 2011) General Linear Modeling was also undertaken to assist with the creation of the barometer.

SOCIAL COHESION DOMAINS

SOCIAL COHESION DOMAINS

6 SOCIAL COHESION DOMAINS

6.1 The economic domain

In our study underpinning this research paper we have argued that economic indicators such as employment and income must be considered as important preconditions of a socially cohesive society (Turok et al., 2006). Chipkin and Ngqulunga (2008) emphasised that social cohesion provides a foundation for growth and development for societies, and that social cohesion is necessary in government policy. Labour market redress action and affirmative action are also seen as necessary policy tools by which the South African government can promote distributive and procedural justice. Criticisms have, however, been levelled at such measures because they are seen as unconstitutional and discriminatory, and that they promote organisational inefficiency and perpetuate racial identities rather than advance non-racialism (Maphai, 1989; Shubane, 1995; Habib et. al., 2003; Ndletyana, 2008; Moleke, 2006; Alexander, 2007; Kagwanja & Kondlo, 2009). Other scholars such as Friedman and Erasmus (2008:66) examined the topic of race and redress, and indicated that there is very little focus on the efficiency of redress policies such as affirmative action. They argue that supporters of labour market redress are often faced with the difficult dilemma of choosing between greater racial equity and increased productivity and efficiency at the workplace. The research conducted, among others, by Friedman and Erasmus showed that there is a need for an improved understanding of the relationship between economic redress measures and social cohesion (including racial equity).

6.1.1 Proposed indicators

Based on an extensive literature review, the present study adapted the Turok et al. (2006) model for the Economic Domain to investigate economic realities and the perceptions of redress measures on social cohesion (Table 1). Turok et al. (2006) considered employment, income, education and housing as preconditions of social cohesion. We used these indicators as our Economic Domain indicators. In addition, we included questions on redress of basic services, labour market redress action, and affirmative action as part of our Economic Domain indicators. The indicators were structured in such a way that economic well-being (i.e. being employed, having an income and being educated) and a high level of agreement with issues of economic redress would result in a higher score on the Economic Domain. It was expected that the Economic Domain indicators would be influenced by the demographic variables (such as the race group of the respondent).

Table 1: Proposed Economic Domain indicators

Economic Domain:		Source(s)
Indicators	Survey questions used to construct indicators	
• Employment status	• What is your current employment status?	SASAS 2009
• Total monthly household income	• What is the total monthly household income before tax and other deductions?	SASAS 2009
• Health status	• How would you rate your health at present?	SASAS 2009
• Education	• What is your highest level of education?	SASAS 2009
• Household Needs Index (HNI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Household's housing • Household's access to transport • Household's health care • Household's clothing • The amount of food your household had over the last month 	SASAS 2009
Core indicators		
• Redress of Basic Services Index (RBSI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Supply of water • Providing electricity • Removal of refuse • Affordable housing • Access to health care 	SASAS 2009
• Government Responsibility Index (GRI) (<i>Class-base redress measures</i>)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The government should spend more money on creating jobs even if it has to increase taxes • The government should spend more money on social grants for the poor, even if it leads to higher taxes • The government should provide more chances for children from poor families to go to university 	SASAS 2009
• Health redress	• Is it right or wrong for people with higher incomes to buy better health care than people with lower incomes?	SASAS 2009
• Education redress	• Is it right or wrong for people with higher incomes to buy better education than people with lower incomes?	SASAS 2009
• Socio-economic Conflict Index (SECI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Conflict between poor people and rich people • Conflict between the working class and the middle class • Conflict between management and workers • Conflict between people at the top of society and people at the bottom 	SASAS 2009
• Labour Market Redress Action Index (LMRAI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Redistribute land to black South Africans • Preferential hiring and promotion of black South Africans in employment • Preferential hiring and promotion of women in employment 	SASAS 2009
• Affirmative Action Index (AAI)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Affirmative Action policy in South Africa is contributing to a more skilled workforce • Affirmative Action policy in South Africa is creating a society that is more unified 	SASAS 2009

The Economic Domain section first discusses how the sub-domains were constructed. It then employs regression analysis to examine the relationship between basic demographic variables with each economic

sub-domain index. It lastly combines the standardised Economic sub-domain indicators to get an aggregate score that represents the level of economic social cohesion.

6.1.2 Modelling and construction of the economic cohesion sub-domains

An initial factor analysis of all the questions (variables) available for the economic domain was conducted using the Principal Components extraction method with varimax rotation. This initial factor analysis extracted seven components from a total of 27 questions. We conducted a series of factor and reliability analysis for each component. After examining the reliability of each component using Cronbach's alpha coefficients, we constructed these six economic sub-domains: Household Needs Index (HNI), Redress of Basic Services Index (RBSI), Government Responsibility Index (GRI), Socio-Economic Conflict Index (SECI), Labour Market Redress Action Index (LMRAI), and Affirmative Action Index (AAI). The results of the factor and reliability analysis are reported in Appendix Table 2. Although Health Redress and Education Redress could be combined to form a two-item construct, we decided to treat them separately³. We did not use the Government Responsibility Index (GRI) and Socio-economic Conflict Index (SECI) in any of the analysis in this research paper⁴.

After the sub-domains were identified, seven regressions (Table 2) were undertaken. The Health Redress was regressed on a set of demographic variables (Model I). Education Redress was also regressed on all the demographic variables (Model II). This is followed by models where the Labour Market Redress Action Index (LMRAI) (Model III), Affirmative Action Index (AAI) (Model IV), Redress of Basic Services Index (RBSI) (Model V) and Household Needs Index (HNI) (Model VI) were regressed on the same demographic variables.

The last regression (Model VII) examined the impact of the demographic variables on an overall index of economic cohesion. The dependent variable (Economic Domain score) of Model VII represented an average of all the economic sub-domain scores: health redress, education redress, labour market redress action, affirmative action, redress of basic services and household needs.

6.1.3 Key results of the Economic Domain

Model I shows that a number of the demographic variables included are statistically significant predictors of health redress. In other words, this regression analysis revealed that there are significant differences among the various categories of some of the demographic variables in explaining support for health redress. For instance, we found that coloureds and Indians are significantly different from blacks in their support for health redress. Moreover, coloureds and Indians were less supportive of health redress compared to blacks. All the provinces are in favour of health redress when compared to the Eastern Cape. However, Free State did not significantly differ from the Eastern Cape in explaining health redress.

Model II shows that Indians are significantly different from blacks in predicting educational redress. Indians are less likely to support educational redress compared to blacks. We also found that those respondents with high LSM differed significantly from those with a low LSM. Those respondents living in traditional areas are more in support of educational redress than those in the urban formal areas. KwaZulu-Natal, North West, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and Limpopo are more in favour of educational redress compared to the Eastern Cape.

Model III shows that coloured, Indian and white respondents were significantly less positive about labour redress than blacks. The Western Cape, Northern Cape, Free State, and Limpopo were less in support of labour market redress compared to the Eastern Cape. However, the North West was more in support of labour market redress compared to the Eastern Cape.

The regression analysis in Model IV shows that those respondents aged 60 to 69 years differed significantly from those aged 16 to 19 years on affirmative action redress. The older respondents (aged 60 to 69) compared to the younger respondents (aged 16 to 19 years) were less in favour of affirmative action redress. We also found that coloured, Indian and white respondents were significantly less in support of affirmative action compared to blacks. The Western Cape, Free State and KwaZulu-Natal were less in support of affirmative action redress compared to the Eastern Cape. However, Mpumalanga was more in favour of affirmative action redress compared to the Eastern Cape.

³ See Table 1 for the specific question items of the Health Redress and Education Redress indicators. We kept health and education separate despite a reliability (Cronbach's alpha) score of 0.91, indicating a reliable index if we constructed a two-item construct (health and education redress).

⁴ These two indices are discussed in detail in the main report.

Model V shows that Indians were significantly less positive about redress of basic services than blacks. The medium and high LSM groups compared to the low LSM groups were significantly more positive about redress of basic services. Those respondents from the informal, rural formal and traditional areas were significantly less positive about redress of basic services than those in the urban formal areas. KwaZulu-Natal, North West and Limpopo province were less positive about redress of basic services compared to the Eastern Cape.

Model VI shows that whites were significantly more positive about their households needs when compared to blacks. In specific, whites indicated that their household's housing, transport, health care, clothing and food were adequate for their household's needs. On the other hand, Blacks indicated they do not have adequate housing, transport, health care, etc. to cater for their household's needs. Those respondents with higher education such as matric and post-matric qualifications were significantly more positive about their household needs than those with no schooling. This result implies that respondents with higher educational qualifications were more likely to secure, for example, adequate housing and health care for their household's needs. We found that those respondents with a higher standard of living (high LSM) were able to cater for their households

needs such as health care and clothing much better than those respondents with a lower standard of living (low LSM). All the provinces were positive about their household needs when compared to the Eastern Cape.

In the regression analysis (Model VII) the demographic variables were regressed on the overall economic cohesion index. The results shows that coloureds, Indians and whites compared with blacks differed significantly in terms of their perceptions of economic cohesion. More specifically, coloureds, Indians and whites were more positive about their views of economic cohesion than blacks. Those with tertiary education were significantly more in support of economic redress measures than those with no schooling. The respondents with a medium LSM were less economically cohesive than those with a low LSM. The respondents living in traditional areas, urban informal and rural formal areas differed significantly from urban formal dwellers on the social economic domain. The respondents from the traditional, urban informal and rural formal areas were more economically cohesive compared to the urban formal dwellers. All the provinces appeared more economically cohesive when compared to the Eastern Cape.



Reference for Adjacent Table

Reference variables are: 16–19 years (age), female (sex), black South African (race), no schooling (education level), low living standards, and formal urban areas (geographic location). The dependent variables are composite indicators where 0 = lowest score and 100 = highest cohesion score. n.s. Significant difference at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, not significant.

Table 2: Regression of economic sub-domain scores on demographic variables, 2009

	Health redress sub-domain score (0–100 scale)		Education sub-domain score (0–100 scale)		Labour Market redress sub-domain score (0–100 scale)		Affirmative Action redress sub-domain score (0–100 scale)		Redress basic services sub-domain score (0–100 scale)		Household Needs sub-domain score (0–100 scale)		Overall Economic Domain score	
	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model VII	Model I	Model II	Model III	Model IV	Model V	Model VI	Model VII
	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.
Age: 20–29 years	0.520	n.s.	-0.766	n.s.	-0.321	n.s.	0.600	n.s.	-0.902	n.s.	0.600	n.s.	-1.735	n.s.
Age: 30–39 years	-0.548	n.s.	-1.287	n.s.	0.081	n.s.	-2.084	n.s.	-1.174	n.s.	-2.084	n.s.	-2.101	n.s.
Age: 40–49 years	2.322	n.s.	1.103	n.s.	-0.773	n.s.	-2.277	n.s.	-0.441	n.s.	-2.277	n.s.	-2.441	n.s.
Age: 50–59 years	3.988	n.s.	3.791	n.s.	-0.383	n.s.	-2.624	n.s.	-1.386	n.s.	-2.624	n.s.	0.326	n.s.
Age: 60–69 years	-0.818	n.s.	1.248	n.s.	0.795	n.s.	-5.048	*	-1.654	n.s.	-5.048	n.s.	-2.063	n.s.
Age: 70+ years	5.380	n.s.	5.449	n.s.	2.994	n.s.	-4.415	n.s.	-3.075	n.s.	-4.415	n.s.	3.202	n.s.
Female	-1.646	n.s.	-1.386	n.s.	1.115	n.s.	0.303	n.s.	0.305	n.s.	0.303	n.s.	-0.139	n.s.
Race: Coloured	-4.258	*	-2.275	n.s.	-16.194	***	-8.759	***	-2.013	n.s.	-8.759	n.s.	-0.439	n.s.
Race: Indian	-7.158	**	-6.413	**	-31.525	***	-23.426	***	-3.538	*	-23.426	n.s.	-0.057	n.s.
Race: White	-2.474	n.s.	1.371	n.s.	-27.625	***	-18.952	***	-0.231	n.s.	-18.952	n.s.	5.472	**
Education: Primary	-2.505	n.s.	-0.425	n.s.	3.476	n.s.	2.054	n.s.	0.060	n.s.	2.054	n.s.	0.796	n.s.
Education: Grades 8–11 or equivalent	0.919	n.s.	1.470	n.s.	0.858	n.s.	0.387	n.s.	-1.112	n.s.	0.387	n.s.	1.535	n.s.
Education: Matric or equivalent	5.312	n.s.	5.986	n.s.	1.751	n.s.	1.649	n.s.	1.076	n.s.	1.649	n.s.	5.945	**
Education: Tertiary	5.097	n.s.	4.704	n.s.	2.044	n.s.	-0.054	n.s.	2.115	n.s.	-0.054	n.s.	15.116	***
Medium living standards	-1.628	n.s.	0.479	n.s.	1.580	n.s.	1.601	n.s.	16.333	***	1.601	n.s.	11.694	***
High living standards	4.464	n.s.	5.848	*	-0.703	n.s.	3.223	n.s.	21.153	***	3.223	n.s.	25.511	***
Informal urban settlement	1.110	n.s.	3.936	n.s.	2.132	n.s.	1.099	n.s.	-13.839	***	1.099	n.s.	-2.291	n.s.
Rural traditional authority areas	0.796	n.s.	4.935	*	-0.047	n.s.	-1.208	n.s.	-15.378	***	-1.208	n.s.	0.252	n.s.
Rural farm worker households	-0.931	n.s.	1.319	n.s.	0.791	n.s.	-1.550	n.s.	-8.037	***	-1.550	n.s.	2.310	n.s.
Western Cape	1.219	n.s.	3.075	n.s.	-19.025	***	-15.636	***	0.113	n.s.	-15.636	n.s.	13.284	***
Northern Cape	13.556	***	17.038	***	-7.309	***	0.940	n.s.	-1.375	n.s.	0.940	n.s.	17.497	***
Free State	-0.469	n.s.	-0.908	n.s.	-12.715	***	-7.348	***	-0.764	n.s.	-7.348	n.s.	13.226	***
KwaZulu-Natal	24.020	***	28.316	***	-2.452	n.s.	-12.983	***	-6.235	***	-12.983	n.s.	17.081	***
North West	33.463	***	25.526	***	6.016	**	4.329	n.s.	-15.474	***	4.329	n.s.	10.447	***
Gauteng	24.939	***	26.929	***	-1.496	n.s.	1.092	n.s.	-1.876	n.s.	1.092	n.s.	7.540	***
Mpumalanga	16.291	***	21.909	***	0.547	n.s.	9.322	***	-0.057	n.s.	9.322	n.s.	9.414	***
Limpopo	29.109	***	30.626	***	-10.042	***	0.035	n.s.	-1.696	n.s.	0.035	n.s.	15.280	***
Constant	45.950		39.682		74.123		71.939		44.980		71.939		9.477	
Number of observations	3124		3124		3124		3124		3124		3124		3124	
Adj. R-squared	0.132		0.124		0.339		0.210		0.264		0.210		0.268	

6.2 The socio-cultural domain

In the South African context, cohesion within the socio-cultural domain must be conceptualised in a broad, democratic and progressive way and should include principles of unity, non-racialism, and non-sexism, which formed the core of the national liberation struggle and are now central to the Constitution. The common purpose should be uniting around a progressive, non-racial, non-sexist and pro-poor society.

Although these principles should prevail in any democratic society, it is particularly challenging to uphold them in South Africa, partly because of a history that promoted social exclusivity, social antagonism and social isolation. As people tried to adapt to forced segregation during the apartheid era, institutions such as the family, communities, cultural life, values and attitudes were forcibly changed. Practices of community (Pillay, 2008) showed tendencies of “increased fragmentation rather than unification”, i.e. the ways in which people cohered were not necessarily “positive” or inclusive. Insular forms of cohesion were common, with people defining themselves in defensive relation to an “other”. Social ills such as the breakdown of authority of parents and caretakers, domestic violence and abuse, low performance, high crime rate, violence, alcohol and drug abuse were some of the social ills resulting from families that were torn apart by apartheid policies. Both proponents and opponents of apartheid were shaped by these forces, which still dominate our society today where patterns of racism, inequality, underdevelopment and distrust remain evident. Social cleavages based on race, gender, class and geography linger as a reality. This section focuses on cohesion in the social domain and includes measures around social networks, personal well-being, discrimination, racism, tolerance and fear of crime.

6.2.1 Proposed indicators

Based on the literature review, proposed indicators for measuring social cohesion as part of the socio-cultural domain are listed below. Many of the proposed variables were not available in the SASAS datasets and could not be included in the analysis (see Table 3). The available indicators were used as indicators or independent variables. The variables used in the study were: social networks, the Personal Well-Being Index, a variable on discrimination, and three variables measuring tolerance, namely, racial tolerance, tolerance towards same sex relationships, and tolerance towards foreigners. A Fear of Crime Index was created, using a combination of variables. In addition, a behavioural question which measured interracial contact was included.

A useful tool for determining social capital and therefore social interaction and connections is social networks. Theories (Putnam, 1993; Narayan and Pritchett, 1997; Kingdon and Knight, 2001) suggest that by measuring the membership of voluntary organisations, social capital or connectiveness can be determined, which in turn leads to various opportunities for economic advancement. A measurement of social networks is important, but it should be developed to include social support in neighbourhoods, that is, whether the person has someone who can help them if they need to see a doctor, go to the clinic, and so on.

As part of the social domain, the personal well-being index was also considered. The personal well-being index gives a good overview of satisfaction with life in terms of financial security, achievements in life, safety, standard of living, life as a whole, feeling part of a community, health, personal relationships and religion.

Central to the social domain are issues of discrimination and tolerance. Tolerant societies where discriminatory practices are minimal are seen as progressive and generally cohesive. Questions about discrimination and tolerance are therefore crucial to include in the measurement.

Literature is clear that crime, or specifically fear of crime, impacts severely on social cohesion (Jackson, 2004, Roberts, 2011, Ross and Jang, 2000). Fear of crime is therefore measured due to its potential harm to social cohesion.

One of the most cited and agreed upon suggestions of overcoming hostilities between groups is regular interaction among the groups (Allport, 1954; Herek and Capitanio, 1996; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Therefore, a metric measuring intergroup contact, more specifically contact between different race groups and contact with foreigners, was included.

Table 3: Proposed socio-cultural domain indicators

Socio-Cultural Domain:		Source(s)
Indicators	Survey questions used to construct indicators	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Social network 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indicate if anyone in your household belongs to any of the following groups: Stokvel; Burial Society; Community Garden Group; Farmers, Association; Sewing Group; Sports Group; Study Group; Singing or Music Group; HIV/AIDS Group; Youth Group; Informal Traders Group; Men's Association; Women's Association; Religious Group; School Governing Body; Community Safety/development Group; Water Committee; Development Committee; Tribal Authority; Trade Union; Political Party. 	SASAS 2010
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personal Well-Being Index 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Satisfaction with life as a whole • Satisfaction with standard of living • Satisfaction with health • Satisfaction with what you have achieved in life • Satisfaction with personal relationships • Satisfaction with personal safety • Satisfaction with feeling part of a community • Satisfaction with future financial security • Satisfaction with spirituality or religion 	SASAS 2010
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Discrimination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • On what ground is your group discriminated against? 	SASAS 2010
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tolerance 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Racial tolerance: How often do you feel racially discriminated against? • Tolerance towards same-sex partners: Do you think it is wrong or not wrong for two adults of the same sex to have sexual relations? Gay men and lesbians should be free to live their own life as they wish. • Tolerance towards immigrants: I generally welcome all immigrants/some immigrants/no immigrants to South Africa. • Religious tolerance • Gender tolerance • Tolerance towards the disabled 	SASAS 2010 Proposed indicator Proposed indicator Proposed indicator
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crime 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fear of crime 	SASAS 2010
Interracial contact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Frequency of contact between different race groups 	SASAS 2010

6.2.2 Modelling and construction of the socio-cultural cohesion sub-domains

An initial factor analysis of all indicators available for the socio-cultural domain was conducted using the Principal Components extraction method with varimax rotation. This initial factor analysis extracted four components from a total of 29 socio-cultural variables. We then conducted a series of factor and reliability analysis for each component. After examining the reliability of each component using Cronbach's alpha coefficients, we constructed three sub domains: Contact and tolerance, Quality of life, and Racial Discrimination and Tolerance (the results of the factor and reliability analysis are reported in Appendix Table 2). A Cronbach's alpha coefficient of 0.46 was noted for the analysis. This low Cronbach alpha suggests that better indicators could be used for measurement in the socio-cultural domain. This is noted, and even before analysis we found that the available variables were not ideal. It is suggested that a coherent set of questions be developed to measure the socio-cultural domain in future rounds of surveys.

Our next step was to do a regression. Four regressions were conducted (Table 4). In the first instance, contact and tolerance were regressed on a set of demographic and socio economic variables (Model I). Then the quality of life sub-domain was regressed on the same set of demographic and socio economic variables (Model II). A third regression was done using the racial discrimination and racial tolerance sub-domain (Model III). The last model (Model IV) represents an average of all the socio-economic sub-domain scores and is regressed with the same set of demographic and socio economic variables.

6.2.3 Key results from the regression analysis

Model I (Table 4) shows that a number of the demographic and household variables were statistically significant predictors on the contact and tolerance sub-domain. The youngest age cohort (16–19-year-olds) were found to be much more tolerant towards immigrants and gay people and also had more interracial contact than people from the older age cohorts (20–69 year-olds). This finding is encouraging, showing that young people are interacting more (on a friendship basis) with other race groups and are showing more tolerance towards gays and immigrants. White respondents scored significantly lower than black respondents, an indication that whites are more intolerant towards immigrants, gays and have less interracial contact. The other race groups were not significantly different from each other. Education levels seem to play a role in interracial contact and tolerance. People with higher levels of education (Grade 8 and

above) were significantly more tolerant and had more interracial contact than people with no or primary school education. People from rural traditional areas were found to be significantly less tolerant than people from urban formal areas, and were also less likely to have interracial contact. People residing in the Western Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and Free State were much more likely to be tolerant and have interracial contact than people from Eastern Cape.

Model II shows that the quality of life domain score (which was formed by the Personal Well-Being Index and Fear of Crime Index scores) showed that younger people (16–19-year-olds) scored significantly higher on this index than people aged between 30 and 49 and those older than 60. This means that the younger people were generally less fearful of crime and more satisfied with life. Females were also significantly different from males, being much less satisfied with their personal well-being and also more fearful of crime. In terms of geography, people living in informal settlements and on rural farms scored much higher in this domain than people living in formal urban areas. Provincial analysis showed that all provinces were significantly different from Eastern Cape and all provinces scored higher than the Eastern Cape on this sub-domain. People in the Eastern Cape therefore seem to have lower life satisfaction (as measured by the Personal Well-Being Index) and are also more fearful of crime.

Model III shows results as they pertain to the racial discrimination and racial tolerance sub-domain. In terms of age, the young age group (16–19-year-olds) are much less inclined to feel racially discriminated against and also much more likely to be tolerant of other race groups than people aged between 20 and 69. In terms of gender, males and females significantly differed in that males were much more likely than females to feel discriminated against and were also much more racially intolerant than females. People with a high living standard measurement felt significantly more racially discriminated against and were less racially tolerant than people with a low living standard measurement. People from the Northern Cape and North West differed significantly from people from the Eastern Cape, feeling more racially discriminated against. People from Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal felt less racially discriminated against compared to the Eastern Cape.

In the regression analysis (Model IV), the demographic and socio economic variables were regressed on the overall socio-cultural cohesion index. From the results it is evident that the young age cohort (16–19-year-olds) is more liberal, tolerant, and racially integrated, with a general by better quality of life score. This is particularly encouraging, since this age group starts to signify the trend of the Born Frees (born after 1994), and suggests a more liberalised cohort. In terms of race, it is evident

that whites are significantly different from blacks, being less socio-culturally cohesive. Education plays a role when it comes to tolerance towards immigrants and gay people, with people with a higher level of education being more tolerant than people with a lower level of education. People with a higher level of education also have significantly more interracial contact. People with a high living standard measurement felt significantly more racially discriminated against and were less racially tolerant than people with a low living standard

measurement. People living in rural traditional authority areas had less interracial contact and were less tolerant towards immigrant and gay people. In terms of all sub-domains, but specifically the quality of life domain, provinces significantly differed from the reference group, namely the Eastern Cape.

Table 4: Regression of socio-cultural cohesion domain and sub-domain scores on demographic variables, 2010

	Contact and tolerance sub-domain score (0–100)		Quality of life sub-domain score (0–100)		Racial discrimination and tolerance sub-domain score (0–100)		Socio-cultural cohesion domain score (0–100)	
	Model I		Model II		Model III		Model IV	
	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Coef.	Signif.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.
(A) Respondent’s								
Age: 20–29 years	-4.717	***	-1.653	n.s.	-4.021	***	-3.213	***
Age: 30–39 years	-5.013	***	-3.456	*	-3.801	***	-4.067	***
Age: 40–49 years	-6.404	***	-4.046	*	-4.564	***	-4.502	***
Age: 50–59 years	-6.845	***	-2.912	n.s.	-3.302	**	-3.655	***
Age: 60–69 years	-1.514	n.s.	-5.206	**	-4.676	**	-3.324	**
Age: 70+ years	-4.865	*	-5.282	*	0.842	n.s.	-2.596	*
Female	0.491	n.s.	-3.880	***	1.848	**	-0.124	n.s.
Race: coloured	-0.506	n.s.	2.829	n.s.	-0.576	n.s.	-0.730	n.s.
Race: Indian	0.077	n.s.	-3.919	n.s.	-0.898	n.s.	-1.422	n.s.
Race: white	-6.778	***	0.129	n.s.	-1.265	n.s.	-3.363	***
Education: Primary	3.276	n.s.	-1.929	n.s.	-0.254	n.s.	0.753	n.s.
Education: Grades 8-11 or equivalent	5.185	**	0.858	n.s.	-0.762	n.s.	2.399	*
Education: Matric or equivalent	8.518	***	-0.990	n.s.	-0.262	n.s.	3.102	**
Education: Tertiary	11.496	***	0.173	n.s.	-1.066	n.s.	4.245	**
(B) Household characteristics								
Medium living standards	-3.307	*	-1.546	n.s.	-0.767	n.s.	-1.326	n.s.
High living standards	-1.679	n.s.	2.076	n.s.	-3.450	**	-1.016	n.s.
Informal urban settlement	1.758	n.s.	4.490	**	-1.888	n.s.	0.251	n.s.
Rural traditional authority areas	-3.332	**	-1.012	n.s.	-1.039	n.s.	-2.336	***
Rural farm-worker households	-0.913	n.s.	6.536	**	-2.547	n.s.	0.109	n.s.
Western Cape	11.114	***	18.516	***	1.573	n.s.	10.046	***
Northern Cape	4.708	n.s.	17.632	***	-3.935	*	3.905	**
Free State	3.723	*	15.492	***	1.125	n.s.	6.007	***
KwaZulu-Natal	5.095	***	8.429	***	2.295	*	5.296	***
North West	0.106	n.s.	4.657	*	-5.580	***	-0.600	n.s.
Gauteng	-1.071	n.s.	9.000	***	2.437	*	1.908	*
Mpumalanga	1.518	n.s.	11.591	***	1.391	n.s.	4.660	***
Limpopo	3.360	*	18.807	***	1.657	n.s.	7.208	***
Constant	29.794	***	49.808		46.583		39.455	***
Number of observations	2657		2397		2860		2974	
Adj. R-squared	0.0735		0.1044		0.0332		0.0959	

Reference variables are: 16–19 years (age), female (sex), black (race), no schooling (education level), low living standards, formal urban areas (geographic location) and Eastern Cape (province). The dependent variables are composite indicators where 0=lowest score and 100=highest cohesion score.

*, **, ***, n.s. Significant difference at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, not significant.

6.3 The civic domain

6.3.1 Proposed indicators

Table 5: Proposed civic cohesion indicators

Civic domain		
Indicators	Survey questions used to construct various sub-domain indicators	Source(s)
Legitimacy or illegitimacy		
National identities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Intensity of feelings of national pride 	SASAS/ WVS/ Afrobarometer/ GCIS
Approval of regime principles and values		
Evaluations of Regime Performance	<p>Satisfaction with the way that the government is handling:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Supply of water and sanitation Providing electricity Affordable housing Access to health care Treatment for sexually transmitted infections (STIs), including HIV/AIDS Job creating Land reform Providing social grants (for example, child support grant, old age pension, and so on) Education <p>Satisfaction in democracy and government:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Satisfaction with the way democracy works Batho Pele Index – self-rated performance of municipalities against the Batho Pele (People First) principles 	SASAS 2009
Confidence in Regime Institutions	<p>Level of trust in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> National government Local government Courts Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) The SABC The police Parliament Traditional authorities/leaders Churches Defence force 	SASAS 2009
Approval of Incumbent office-holders	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The President Premier of your province Elected local government councillor 	Afrobarometer

Participation		
Participation in legal political activities Participation in illegal political activities	Done the following in the last year: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Signed a petition • Taken part in a protest march or demonstration • Contacted a politician, government or local government official • Contacted a traditional leader • Contacted radio, TV or a newspaper • Worked in a political party or action group [Distinction between legal and illegal not effectively addressed in current measures.]	SASAS 2009
Political interest	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How interested would you say you are in politics? • On average how often do you: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Read the political content of newspaper? • Watch political news on TV? • Listen to political news on the radio? • Use the internet to obtain political news or information? 	SASAS 2009
Citizenship norms	“To be a good citizen, how important is it for a person to... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ... support people who are worse off than themselves? • ... vote in elections? (all elections are meant.) • ... always obey laws and regulations? • ... form their own opinion, independently of others? • ... be active in voluntary organisations? • ... be active in politics? (In the sense of active in any political or lobby groups, not just in party organisations.) The following items were listed (scored from 0 if considered extremely unimportant to 10 if considered extremely important.	ESS, 2002 – CID module; ISSP 2004 citizenship module

Over the last two decades, a groundswell of concern in the international political sciences community about an apparent erosion of the foundations of citizenship and democracy has emerged. This “crisis of democratic legitimacy” perspective is typically underpinned by a raft of indicators suggesting diminishing electoral participation, declining public trust in government, a loss of social capital, weakening interpersonal trust, and mounting public discontent and disaffection (Dionne, 1991; Putnam, 2000; Pharr & Putnam, 2000; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2000; Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2001; Mair & van Biezen, 2001; Franklin, 2004; Wattenberg, 2002; Macedo., 2005; Torcal & Montero, 2006; Van Deth et al., 2007). This has resulted in a broad-ranging set of initiatives and reforms directed at rebuilding the relationship between citizens and the state. These have included measures focused on promoting greater opportunities for the direct engagement of citizens in decision-making processes, and the strengthening of state accountability and transparency (Norris, 2011).

There are, however, emerging challenges to the crisis hypothesis. Recent citizenship literature has emphasised that public participation is undergoing fundamental change rather than decline. It is argued that, in contrast with a more conventional duty-based view of citizenship, a new normative form of citizenship has arisen, which is increasingly being referred to as “engaged citizenship” (Dalton, 2006a, b, 2008a, b; Zukin et al., 2006; Denters et al., 2007; Van Deth, 2007; Coffé & van der Lippe, 2010; McBeth et al., 2010). This school of thought asserts that norms of citizenship are changing along with social and political developments and progress in societies, and that the legitimacy crisis argument tends to focus only on duty-based citizenship, which encompasses adherence to social order (for example, reporting of crimes, always obeying laws and regulations) and the civic responsibility to vote. By contrast, scholars such as Russell Dalton (2006a, 2008a) emphasise that weakening norms of duty-based citizenship have been accompanied by the

strengthening of alternative engaged citizenship norms that portray the “good citizen” as being active in civil society groups and general political activity, politically independent (autonomy), and possessing a strong sense of social solidarity according to which there is a stronger inclination towards civic activities such as volunteering and fundraising, in addition to economy-related engagement such as consumer boycotts.

Another important challenge is found in the recently published comparative study of political governance, opinion and behaviour by Pippa Norris, entitled *Democratic Deficits: Critical Citizens Revisited* (2011). This in-depth analysis examines cross-national data to argue that public support for the political system across countries has not declined uniformly, with evidence suggesting ebbs and flows in confidence with government and democracy, rather than an intensifying surge in disaffection. Norris persuasively argues for the salience of “democratic deficits”, in which the perceived performance of democracy diverges from public expectations or aspirations for democracy. Varying in size and distribution across countries, it is contended that such democratic deficits are most probably the product of interactions between burgeoning public expectations, negative media coverage relating to politics, government and public affairs, and worries about deteriorating government performance.

Drawing on our conceptual model in addition to the emerging international consensus around multidimensional social cohesion (Jensen, 1998; Bernard, 1999; Duhaime et al., 2004; Chan et al., 2006;), we retain and employ two broad distinctions in our approach to measuring civic cohesion, namely the dichotomies between (i) political legitimacy and illegitimacy, which focus primarily on public confidence in public and private institutions; and (ii) participation and passivity, which include indicators of involvement in different forms of political activities and membership of organisations

6.3.2 Legitimacy

In identifying and categorising the different dimensions of social cohesion in the late 1990s, Jensen (1998) and Bernard (1999) both included the “legitimacy and illegitimacy” dichotomy, arguing that social cohesion depends on legitimacy of public and private institutions to serve as mediators in resolving differences and conflicts of interest in diverse societies. Duhaime et al. (2004) similarly incorporate trust and confidence in civic institutions among their mapping of social cohesion. Another influential contribution is Chan et al. (2006), who propose that the attitudinal or subjective component of state-citizen cohesion (the vertical dimension of social cohesion) should be comprised of indicators

such as trust in public figures together with confidence in political and other major social institutions. Vergolini (2011) identifies a “civic integration” dimension of social cohesion which contains indicators of institutional trust, interpersonal trust and the perceived quality of services. This draws on Whelan and Maître (2005), who identify confidence in the social benefit system, perceived quality of services and interpersonal trust, as aspects of social cohesion in society. In an effort to integrate this work, Dickes et al (2010) further conceptualise civic cohesion as comprising four principal components, namely: (i) confidence in national distribution systems (for example, education, social security, health care, justice); (ii) confidence in national organisations (for example, press, labour unions, police, parliament, civil service); (iii) confidence in authority institutions (for example, churches, armed forces); and (iv) satisfaction in democracy and government (including satisfaction with the way democracy develops, subjective rating of political systems). This framework is again employed in Dickes et al. (2011) and Acket et al. (2011) as part of their cross-country comparisons of social cohesion across Europe.

The aforementioned classification by Dickes and colleagues has some degree of resonance with that proposed by Pippa Norris (2011:24), which is arguably the most encompassing representation of political legitimacy to date. Expanding on Easton (1965, 1975), Norris clusters indicators of political support into a multidimensional framework consisting of five components of support, ranging from the most generalised to the most specific. The dimensions are: (i) national identities; (ii) approval of regime principles and values; (iii) evaluations of regime performance; (iv) confidence in regime institutions; and (v) approval of incumbent office-bearers. This political typology is adopted for the clustering of indicators relating to the legitimacy sub-domain of civic cohesion in the South African context, as it offers a more nuanced view of legitimacy that extends beyond mere institutional trust.

The first component, national identities, represents the most general set of attitudes towards belonging or attachment to the state, with common survey-based measures and indicators including national pride, patriotism and feelings of national identity. This component is largely absent from the Dickes et al (2010) conceptualisation, though it does feature in the current set of development indicators for social cohesion that are being used for monitoring purposes by the South African Presidency. The second dimension of support—approval of regime principles and values—addresses support for fundamental democratic principles and values. The third level is evaluations of regime performance, and is conceived as the views of citizens towards the democratic performance of the government, as well as assessments of decision-making

processes, policies and policy outcomes. Fourthly, confidence in regime institutions refers to trust in public sector institutions, most notably, in Norris's view, the levels of public support for the government legislature, executive, the judiciary and courts, the security forces, the different tiers of government (national, provincial, local), land civil service, in addition to political parties. This dimension overlaps with the Dickes et al (2010) confidence in national organisations and authority institutions components, though in their framework the focus is not exclusively on public sector institutions but also incorporates a number of other significant social institutions, such as the press, trade unions, and churches. It is also worth re-emphasising that institutional trust remains at the heart of most attempts at identifying indicators of political or civic cohesion. As such, it remains a salient omission from the Presidency's development indicators. These indicators are common inclusions in SASAS, the World Values Survey and Afrobarometer. The last level of support recognised by Norris (2011) is the approval of incumbent office bearers, which entails public attitudes towards the president, ministers, party leaders, and elected representatives. Coverage in pre-existing surveys in South Africa is mixed on this component. Both Afrobarometer and the World Values Survey ask about confidence in the President, while SASAS asks about politicians, but very few other variables are commonly available.

6.3.3 Participation

Apart from political legitimacy, the second component or sub-domain of civic cohesion that has become a common inclusion in multidimensional models since the late 1990s is the "participation-passivity" dichotomy. In many respects, this component relates to notions of citizenship, especially civic behaviour and attitudes. This is most evident in the increasing use of the term "active citizenship", especially in Europe, to refer to specific aspects of participation that are to be encouraged as a means of consolidating and sustaining representative, participatory democracy, reducing the divide between institutions of the state and citizens, and fostering social cohesion (Hoskins & Mascherini, 2009: 459-460; Council of Europe, 2000). Even in the South African context, the speech by President Zuma cited at the introduction to the paper makes reference to the need for an active citizenry as part of a nation-building agenda.

A quick scan of relevant social cohesion measurement literature translates participation in a fairly standard set of constituent elements and indicators. Dickes et al (2010, 2011) and Acket et al (2011) include participation in both legal and illegal political activities, together with political concern or interest to assess levels of participation. Chan et al (2006), Rajulton et al (2007) and Jensen (2010) focus on electoral

participation, participation in political and civic groups and volunteering and charitable giving. Finally, Vergolini (2011) marries associational participation with indicators of willingness to cooperate or participate, the latter referring predominantly to engagement in activities such as petitions, lawful demonstrations, and product boycotts. These largely behavioural components have been effectively integrated and supplemented with attitudinal indicators by Hoskins & Mascherini (2009: 468-469) in their framework for measuring active citizenship, which includes four principal dimensions:

- **Protest and social change:** This includes protest activities (signing a petition, participating in a lawful demonstration, product boycotts and ethical consumption) and membership, participation, volunteering and/or donations in respect of human rights organisations, environmental organisation or trade unions.
- **Community life:** This is conceived as consisting primarily of membership, participation, volunteer work and/or donations with reference to different types of community organisations (religious, business, cultural, social, sport and parent-teacher organisations).
- **Representative democracy:** This focuses mainly on engagement in political parties (membership, participation, donating money or voluntary work), and electoral turnout.
- **Democratic values:** This pillar has citizenship norms, which includes the importance that citizens attach to different attributes of what it means to be a "good citizen", and taps into aspects of participation, autonomy, social order and solidarity, at its core (Pattie et al., 2004; Dalton, 2006a, 2008a; Coffé & van der Lippe, 2010). Apart from citizen norms, the authors also include intercultural understanding and human rights values as notable aspects.

This framework has an intuitive appeal. It accommodates an appropriate mix of behavioural and attitudinal measures, combines most indicators already used in pre-existing multidimensional civic cohesion measurement efforts, and is also appropriately theoretically grounded. In a society such as South Africa, where salient changes in the relationship between citizen and state have begun to take place over the last decade, it is essential to have a set of measures that is able to capture changes in both values and patterns of behaviour.

The availability of data with which to populate the civic cohesion domain represents a considerable measurement challenge that constrains the ability to appropriately test the validity and refine a social cohesion barometer in the country. In particular, while there tends to be relatively more data with which to inform this domain than the socio-cultural domain, not all sub-domains have adequate data for key indicators

in one or more rounds of nationally representative survey series or local supplements of cross-national surveys. Instead, coverage is generally highly variable or non-existent, and we commonly find different indicators included in different surveys or rounds of interviewing. For instance, the legitimacy dimension lacks indicators of demand for democracy and approval of incumbent office-bearers, while it is equally difficult to find measures that address the different facets of the participation sub-domain, especially for unconventional, more informal forms of participation. For this exploratory phase of investigation in the development of the barometer, we have predominantly used SASAS, since it is possible to draw on a relatively broad range of attitudes and self-reported behaviours that provide a relatively good set of social, economic and cultural indicators for the modelling exercise. One could argue that a series such as Afrobarometer may be better placed to test the civic domain, but it was decided that, as far as possible, the analysis should rely on a single survey source with a common methodology for all three social cohesion domains.

It is envisaged that civic cohesion should be analysed through the construction of a composite score that combines indicators of the legitimacy and participation sub-domains. What follows is a brief outline of how these measures were constructed followed by multivariate modelling of the scores against a set of core background variables.

6.3.4 Constructing and modelling of civic cohesion and its sub-domains

Multivariate analysis. Factor analysis of all indicators available for the legitimacy domain was conducted using the Principal Components extraction method with varimax rotation. The results show that the components of political support the theoretical framework (Appendix Table 2). The national pride indicators cluster in a single dimension, while there appear to be distinct factors corresponding to performance evaluations and institutional trust. In institutional trust, confidence in local government, political parties and politicians emerges as a separate factor from the other institutions, although the conceptual distinctions for the three (of five) components specified by Norris (2011) that we were able to assess appear valid. Factor analysis for government service delivery and institutional trust indices was conducted using Cronbach's alpha coefficients prior to the construction of a couple of intermediate multi-item indicators to test their validity and reliability. Cronbach's alpha was also used to test the validity of a two-item national pride through correlation analysis and reliability. In all cases, construct indications are that the items are acceptable and reliable.

For the participation sub-domain, we have only basic indicators with which to inform the representative democracy protest, and social change components. Principal Components analysis again suggests that the conceptual framework works well, with voting in elections forming a factor distinct from elements of non-electoral participation and protest, while political interest variables also cluster separately. With a Cronbach alpha of 0.69, the reliability of the items available for inclusion in the participation sub-domain seems broadly reliable too.

The final civic cohesion domain score represents an average of the legitimacy and participation sub-domain scores.

6.3.5 Key results from the Civic Cohesion Domain

Having been constructed The civic cohesion domain and sub-domain scores, regression analysis was performed to examine the relationship between basic demographic variables and the global civic cohesion measure and its two constituent sub-domains (Table 6). Three regressions were conducted. In the first instance, civic cohesion was regressed on a set of demographic and socioeconomic variables (Model I). This is followed by models where the legitimacy index and participation index were regressed on the same demographic and socio economic variables (Models II and III).

Model I shows that many of the demographic and household socioeconomic variables included are statistically significant predictors of civic cohesion. There is a positive association between age and civic cohesion, with those aged from 16–19 years, exhibiting a significantly lower score than all older age cohorts. Statistically significant gender-based differentials are not evident, though a clear variation in civic cohesion among population groups does emerge, with blacks reporting lower scores than coloured, white and Indian respondents. There appears to be an educational gradient to civic cohesion too, with those with no schooling presenting lower scores than those with a matric or tertiary qualification. Other indicators of class are similarly significant, with those with low living standard levels exhibiting lower civic cohesion than those with medium or high living standards, while residents of formal urban areas rate higher than those in informal urban settlements and, rural traditional authority areas and on rural commercial farms.

Looking more specifically at the legitimacy sub-domain in Model II, we find that there are no significant age, gender and educational differences, though the population group and living standards level effects

remain. People living in formal urban areas were again found to report a higher level of legitimacy than those in informal urban settlements and rural traditional authority areas, though there is no observable difference relative to those on rural commercial farms. Finally, in the participation sub-domain (Model III), we find that participation increases with age, women are less likely than men to be politically engaged, while black African

respondents are more likely to be politically active than other population groups. Moreover, class again matters, with those with a matric or higher education more likely to be politically active and interested than those with no schooling. Participation increases alongside living standards, while those in formal urban areas score higher on the participation index than those in informal settlements and rural localities.

Table 6: Regression of civic cohesion domain and sub-domain scores on demographic variables, 2009

	Civic cohesion domain score (0–100)		Legitimacy sub-domain (0–100)		Participation sub-domain (0–100)	
	Model I		Model II		Model III	
	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.	Coef.	Signif.
(A) Respondent's characteristics						
Age: 20-29 years	0.572	n.s.	-0.415	n.s.	3.520	***
Age: 30-39 years	1.757	*	0.308	n.s.	5.718	***
Age: 40-49 years	2.316	**	0.464	n.s.	6.932	***
Age: 50-59 years	2.378	**	-0.262	n.s.	8.781	***
Age: 60-69 years	2.776	**	-0.752	n.s.	8.684	***
Age: 70+ years	0.322	n.s.	-2.001	n.s.	5.891	**
Female	-1.105	**	0.562	n.s.	-4.343	***
Race: Coloured	-5.215	***	-4.359	***	-6.593	***
Race: Indian	-8.837	***	-10.948	***	-7.326	***
Race: White	-5.822	***	-6.235	***	-7.783	***
Education: Primary	1.039	n.s.	0.328	n.s.	2.053	n.s.
Education: Grades 8–11 or equivalent	1.096	n.s.	0.941	n.s.	2.265	n.s.
Education: Matric or equivalent	1.823	n.s.	0.806	n.s.	5.546	***
Education: Tertiary	4.239	***	1.718	n.s.	10.353	***
(B) Household characteristics						
Medium living standards	4.450	***	3.027	***	7.686	***
High living standards	6.984	***	5.823	***	11.368	***
Informal urban settlement	-5.311	***	-5.463	***	-2.312	*
Rural traditional authority areas	-4.176	***	-3.237	***	-2.900	**
Rural farm worker households	-2.093	*	-0.928	n.s.	-4.322	**
Western Cape	-2.680	**	-3.948	**	1.846	n.s.
Northern Cape	1.122	n.s.	2.009	n.s.	4.039	*
Free State	-5.292	***	-5.415	***	-0.056	n.s.
KwaZulu-Natal	-2.881	***	-2.867	**	2.607	**
North West	-4.165	***	-4.238	**	0.317	n.s.
Gauteng	1.065	n.s.	0.166	n.s.	4.729	***
Mpumalanga	2.540	**	5.129	***	0.081	n.s.
Limpopo	3.568	***	4.076	***	5.688	***
Constant	42.386	***	59.216	***	19.945	***
Number of observations	3152		3145		2766	
Adj. R-squared	0.1808		0.0938		0.2232	

Reference variables are; 16–19 years (age), female (sex), black (race), no schooling (education level), low living standards, formal urban areas (geographic location) and Eastern Cape (province). The dependent variables are composite indicators where 0=lowest score and 100=highest cohesion score.

*, **, ***, n.s. Significant difference at the 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, not significant.


SOCIAL COHESION

BAROMETER

7 CONSTRUCTION OF A SOCIAL COHESION BAROMETER

In our attempt to create a single barometer, the regression results from the economic, socio-cultural and civic cohesion domain scores (standardised to 100) are represented by socio-demographic characteristics in the figure below.

Figure 2: Social cohesion domain scores by socio-demographic characteristics (mean scores, 0–100 scale)



Sources: SASAS 2009 for the economic and civic domains; SASAS 2010 for the socio-cultural domain.

Looking across the economic, socio-cultural and civic domains as they pertain to social cohesion, some distinct differences are evident when comparing socio-demographic characteristics. Firstly, when considering the different age groups, it is evident that common values are held among all age groups when economic issues are considered. Nevertheless, we found that the younger respondents (aged 16 to 19) compared to the older respondents (aged 60 to 69) were more in favour of affirmative action redress. In general, however, all age groups seem to value economic redress. When the socio-cultural domain scores are compared by age group, it is interesting to note that the youngest age cohort (16- to 19-year-olds) is significantly different from other age groups. The young age group (often referred to as the Born Frees) are much more socio-culturally cohesive, meaning that they are much more tolerant towards immigrants and gays, have much more interracial contact, feel less discriminated against, and are generally more satisfied with life. Clearly this is a very encouraging sign and signifies hope for the future. This finding is, however, reversed when the civic domain is analysed. Here, the youngest age cohort is significantly less civically cohesive than older age groups. They are specifically less likely to participate in traditional forms of activities associated with active citizenship such as voting. When gender is considered, no significant differences between males and females are found for any of the domains.

It is clear that different values are held between different age groups. In the economic domain, Coloureds, Indians and whites scored higher, indicating that they were more economically cohesive compared to blacks. This overall result indicates a clear distinction between blacks and the other race groups. Moreover, it suggests that whites, coloureds and Indians have a more positive perception about their economic circumstances, while blacks have a more negative perception of their economic situation.

When cohesion in the socio-cultural domain is considered, whites are significantly different from blacks, being less tolerant and more fearful of crime, which in turn impacts on their overall satisfaction with life score. In terms of the civic domain, coloureds, Indians and whites are much less civically active, in other words they are less likely to vote, less likely to have trust in institutions, and less likely to be satisfied with democracy and service delivery. Almost universally, higher education (especially having a matric or above) leads to higher social cohesion scores in all the domains. People with a higher level of education are more likely to be supportive of economic redress and also more economically well-off; they are more tolerant, are more satisfied with life, and feel less discriminated against. They are also more likely to be active participants in matters relating to civic and citizenship duties.

People with different living standards tended to hold different values. For example, the respondents with a medium LSM were less in support of economic redress measures than those with a low LSM. In the civic domain we found that people with a medium to high living standard tended to score higher in terms of socio-cultural cohesion than people with a lower living standard. Also those respondents with high LSM and medium LSM were more positive about their household needs than those with a low LSM.

In terms of geography, it is clear that in the economic domain, people from urban informal settlements, rural farm worker households and rural traditional authority areas were more economically cohesive than people in urban informal settlements. For instance, respondents from these areas were all negative about redress of basic services compared to those in the urban formal areas. In the socio-cultural domain it was found that people living in traditional authority areas are significantly different from people in urban formal areas, being notably less cohesive and tolerant. When analysing the domains by province, it is clear that the Eastern Cape is much less economically cohesive than other provinces. In terms of the socio-cultural domain, it is evident that the Eastern Cape and North West are the least socio-culturally cohesive, and are therefore the least tolerant provinces. In terms of the civic domain, the Northern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and Limpopo were significantly different from the Eastern Cape in terms of civic values. The rest of the provinces did not differ significantly.

REFLECTIONS

NEXT STEPS

8 CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS AND NEXT STEPS

This research paper has attempted to distil the international conceptual and operational material and South African policy discourse relating to social cohesion and integrate it into a conceptual framework that can inform ongoing policy and measurement work on the topic. In common with authors such as Jensen (1998, 2010), Bernard (1999), Chan et al. (2006), Dickes et al (2010) and Vergolini (2011), we perceive social cohesion as consisting of economic, cultural and civic domains. In an attempt to operationalise this framework into a measurement tool for gauging societal progress against its social cohesion goals, we then attempted to identify potential indicators for each of the constituent domains, keeping in mind the considerable challenges in so doing. The latter ranged from issue of unit of analysis to the accommodation of “bonding” and “bridging” (or positive and negative) forms of social cohesion, while also ensuring an appropriate and parsimonious balance of attitudinal and behavioural measures. The analytical results that are subsequently showcased provide a mere glimpse into some salient aspects of economic, cultural and civic cohesion and emerging patterns on some of the core indicators. Across all domains, the salience of addressing social inequalities remains a unifying and recurring theme – which speaks to the necessity of strong state leadership in driving and effectively implementing a developmental, redress agenda, and the importance of a social commitment among the public in support of such societal objectives.

The conceptual and empirical work discussed in this research paper represents the formative stages in a longer journey. The foundational part may be complete; however, substantive engagement with relevant government policy-makers and other non-state actors is still required. This will ensure that the proposed indicators are debated, refined, modified and supplemented so that they come to represent the best possible fit with the social cohesion policy regime envisaged for the country as it finalises and focuses on the realisation of the long-term national vision of our society. Fortunately, this study comes at a time when there is strong political interest and will regarding social cohesion, with many departments embracing the concept as part of their medium-term strategic plans, and with national and sub-national summits and fora

planned to deliberate, consider and shape a strategic approach to address many perceived and actual threats to cohesion.

Once this process of policy engagement and refinement has been completed, there is ideally a need for a process of implementation through field testing of the set of theoretically grounded, multidimensional indicators, using a single research instrument employing a standardised methodology. This fundamental set of procedures will serve as the basis for testing the validity of the measures in a South African context, which in turn will yield a tool that could be used to evaluate social cohesion on a regular basis and alongside pre-existing macro-level development indicators on how South Africa is faring in its progressive attempts to achieve the society that the architects of the Freedom Charter envisioned nearly sixty years ago.

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Notes

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

Appendix Table 1: Presidency 2010 Development Indicators

ECONOMIC GROWTH AND TRANSFORMATION
1 GDP growth
2 Real per capita GDP growth
3 Foreign direct investment (FDI)
4 Gross fixed capital formation
5 Budget surplus or deficit before borrowing
6 Government debt
7 Interest rates: real and nominal
8 Inflation measures: CPI and CPIX
9 Bond points spread
10 R&D expenditure
11 Patents
12 Balance of payments
13 SA's competitiveness outlook
14 Knowledge-based economy index
15 BEE transactions
16 Black and female managers
EMPLOYMENT
17 Employment
18 Unemployment
19 Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP)
POVERTY AND INEQUALITY
20 Per capita income
21 Living standards measures
22 Inequality measures
23 Poverty headcount index
24 Poverty gap analysis
25 Social-assistance support
26 People with disabilities
HOUSEHOLD AND COMMUNITY ASSETS
27 Dwellings
28 Portable water
29 Sanitation
30 Electricity
31 Land restitution
32 Land redistribution
HEALTH
33 Life expectancy
34 Infant and child mortality rate
35 Severe malnutrition under five years
36 Immunisation coverage
37 Maternal mortality ratio
38 HIV prevalence
39 Tuberculosis (TB)
40 Malaria

EDUCATION

- 41 Educator-learner ratio
- 42 Enrolment rates
- 43 National senior certificate pass rate
- 44 Number of candidates for the NSC with passes in Mathematics
- 45 Adult literacy
- 46 Graduating SET students
- 47 Educational performance
- 48 Mathematics and Science achievement

SOCIAL COHESION

- 49 Strength of civil society
- 50 Voter participation
- 51 Voters per province
- 52 Women who are members of legislative bodies
- 53 Confident in a happy future for all races
- 54 Public opinion on race relations
- 55 Country going in the right direction
- 56 Identity based on self-description
- 57 Pride in being South African

SAFETY AND SECURITY

- 58 Victims of crimes
- 59 Number of all crimes
- 60 Contact crime
- 61 Property crime
- 62 Aggravated robberies
- 63 Detection rate
- 64 Charges referred to court
- 65 Conviction rate
- 66 Inmates
- 67 Road accidents

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

- 68 Peace operations
- 69 Democratically elected governments in Africa
- 70 Real GDP growth in Africa
- 71 Sustainable tourism
- 72 Mission operations and trained diplomats
- 73 International agreements

GOOD GOVERNANCE

- 74 Tax returns
- 75 Audits
- 76 Corruption perceptions
- 77 Budget transparency
- 78 Public opinion on delivery of basic services
- 79 Ease of doing business
- 80 Greenhouse gas emissions

DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

Appendix Table 2: Validity and reliability tests for variables used in constructing composite scores in the social cohesion domain and sub-domains

ECONOMIC SUB-DOMAINS	ITEM	VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY
(1) Household Needs Index (HNI)	Multi-item index (five items): Household needs	Single unrotated factor with an Eigen value of 2.97 that explained 59.46 of the common variance. Reliability (Chronbach's Alpha) of. 0.83.
(2) Redress of Basic Services Index (RBSI)	Multi-item index (five items): Basic services	Single unrotated factor with an Eigen value of 2.78 that explained 55.51 percent of the common variance. Reliability analysis (Chronbach's alpha) of. 0.79.
(3) Government Responsibility Index (GRI) (Class base redress measures)	Multi-item index (three items): Government responsibility	Single unrotated factor with an Eigen value of 2.20 that explained 73.45 percent of the common variance. Reliability (Chronbach's alpha) of. 0.82.
(4) Health Redress	Single item	NA
(5) Education Redress	Single item	NA
(6) Socio-Economic Conflict Index (SECI)	Multi-item index (four items): Socio economic conflict	Single unrotated factor with an Eigen value of 2.61 that explained 65.12 percent of the common variance. Reliability (Chronbach's alpha) of. 0.82.
(7) Labour Market Redress Action Index (LMRAI)	Multi-item index (five items):	Single unrotated factor with an Eigen value of 2.03 that explained 67.68 percent of the common variance. Reliability (Chronbach's alpha) of 0.76, indicating a reliable index.
(8) Affirmative Action Index (AAI)	Two-item construct– Affirmative action	Single unrotated factor with an Eigen value of 1.75 that explained 87.38 percent of the common variance. Reliability (Chronbach's alpha) of. 0.86.
SOCIOCULTURAL COHESION DOMAIN		
(A) Tolerance sub-domain		
(1) Racial contact with friends	<i>Single item:</i> <i>Friends in other race groups</i>	
(2) Gay tolerance	<i>Two-item index</i>	
(3) Tolerance towards immigrants	<i>Single item:</i>	
(4) Tolerance towards disabled	n.a. – no data	
(5) Gender tolerance	n.a. – no data	
(6) Religious tolerance	n.a. – no data	
(B) Quality of life sub-domain		
Fear of crime	<i>Multi-item index</i>	-
Personal Well-Being Index	<i>Multi-item index</i>	
(c) Discrimination and racial tolerance sub-domain		
Discrimination	<i>Single-item</i>	
Racial tolerance	<i>Two-item index</i>	

CIVIC COHESION DOMAIN		
(A) Legitimacy sub-domain		
(1) National pride	<i>Two-item construct</i>	The two items are correlated (Pearson's R) at .43. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) of. 0.64.
(2) Approval of regime principles and values	n.a. – no data	
(3) Evaluations of regime performance	<i>Single item:</i> Satisfaction with democracy <i>Multi-item index:</i> Service delivery	– Single unrotated factor (Eigen value = 2.16) explains 42.3% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) of. 0.66.
(4) Confidence in regime institutions	Multi-item index: Institutional trust	Single unrotated factor (Eigenvalue = 4.07) explains 34.0% of common variance. Reliability (Cronbach's Alpha) of. 0.83.
(5) Approval of incumbent office holders	n.a. – no data	n.a.
(B) Participation sub-domain		
1 Representative democracy	<i>Single item:</i> Vote in national election	–
2 Protest & social change	<i>Multi-item index</i>	
3 Community life	n.a. – included in sociocultural domain	n.a.
4 Citizenship norms	n.a. – data not available in SASAS 2009 round; only in 2004 round	n.a.



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